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IV.—THE DIALECTICAL METHOD. (I.)
BY PROF. E. B. MCGILVABY.
IN this paper I shall consider, as far as I may, the objections
that have been raised against the method of the Hegelian
dialectic, with a view to determine what is the real nature of
that method. And in doing this I shall avail myself, in great
part, of Mr. McTaggart's chapter on the development of the
method of the dialectic,1 as a convenient and accessible state-
ment of the views against which I wish to protest as being
unhegelian. It matters not that he presents his views as a
sympathiser with Hegel rather than as an opponent. The
views call for such a discussion as will bear equally against
an adverse school of criticism, which has flourished upon a
misunderstanding of the method it criticises. Even where
Mr. McTaggart's contentions are fire-new, as in his claim
that the negative is not essential to the movement of the
dialectic, what he says will make a good basis upon which to
treat the subject of the negative in its relation to the dialectic,
a favourite subject of the critics.
If there is any work, the results of which depend entirely
upon the integrity of the method employed, that work is
Hegel's Logic. Indeed, the method is more important and
more secure than the results in their detail, and no one
knew this better than its author. In the Introduction to
his Greater Logic, he calls the method " the soul of the
structure,"2 and says of it: "Although I could not possibly
1
 Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, by John McTaggart Ellis McTag-
gart, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge: at the
University Press, 1896. Chapter IV. Part of the work appeared in a
series of articles in MIND (New Series, Nos. 1, 2, 8, and 10).
* Hegel's Wissenscha/t de.r Ijogik, i., 42 (45). In my reference to this
work I follow the pagination of the reissue of 1841, from the press of
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin ; giving in parenthesis the paging of the
first issue. The three volumes of the Logic form the third, fourth and
fifth volumes of the Complete Works. I use the Greater Logic rather
than the Lesser, partly because it is a fuller treatment of the whole
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56 B. B. MCGILVARY:
think that the method which I have pursued—or rather
which this system pursues of itself—might not be capable of
much perfecting, of much thorough revising in its details, I
know, nevertheless, that it is the only true method. This
is clear of itself already from the fact that it is nowise
distinct from its object and content; for it is the content
in.itself, it is the dialectic that the content has within it,
which moves the content forward. It is clear that no treat-
ment can pass for scientific that does not go the gait of this
method and conform to its simple rhythm, for it is the gait
of the subject-matter itself." l
Against this, Mr. McTaggart claims that the method is
not uniform, but is constantly changing, and that the change
is of two kinds: first, from external reflexion, which alone
is at work in the categories of Being, through various in-
termediate forms, till at the last inner reflexion gets in
its hand; secondly, that the negative is not an essential
element in the method, but functions only in its earlier
stages and gradually disappears altogether from the scene
of action.
1. I shall begin with the first point made, namely, that
external reflexion is the power that moves the machinery
in the categories of Being as over against those of Essence
and of Conception. His statement is this: " I n Being each
category appears, taken by itself, to be permanent and ex-
clusive of all others, and to have no principle of transition
in it. •It is only outside reflexion which examines and breaks
down this pretence of stability, and shows us that the dia-
lectic process is inevitable. In Essence, however, each
category by its own import refers to that which follows it,
and the transition is seen to be inherent in its nature. But
it is still felt to be, as it were, only an external effect of that
nature. The categories have still an inner nature, as con-
trasted with the outer relations which they have with the
other categories. - So far as they have this inner nature,
they are still conceived as independent and self-centred.
But with the passage into the notion things alter; that
passage ' is the very hardest, because it proposes that in-
dependent actuality shall be thought as having all its sub-
stantiality in the passing over and identity with the other
subject; partly because it is not so familiar to English readers, and thus
will throw new light on the points discussed ; and partly because the
first volume of the Greater Logic, which concerns us most especially in
the present paper, it the latest work from Hegel's pen, and therefore
represents his matured views better than the Logic of the Encyclopedia.
11., 39 (41, 42).
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THE DIALECTICAL METHOD. 57
independent actuality'.' Not only is the transition now
necessary to the categories, but the transition is the cate-
gories. The reality in any finite category, in this stage,
consists only in its summing up those which went before,
and in leading on to those which come after." *
Now, before we can satisfactorily enter upon a discussion
of this point, it will be necessary to make some preliminary
remarks about the double aspect in which the categories
appear in the Logic. The primary purpose of the Logic is
to show how even the most abstract and seemingly inde-
pendent and inorganic category contains within itself the
me of the whole system of all-inclusive Thought; and how
this life, if allowed full play, will develop that barren cate-
gory through all the stages of thought up to the highest.
Now, as this category grows under our observation, we see
it taking the form of other categories familiar to us. Thus
in the very development of the lowest category we reach
other categories whose evolution it is the business of logic
to display. Hence it is not necessary to give a separate
genealogical table to each category; but the pedigree of one
category will be the pedigree of many—but, from one point
of view,3 not the pedigree of all. And this is an important
point. There are categories that, in the form in which we
ordinarily use them, or rather in which we think we use
them, are not to be found in the direct line of march from
pure Being towards the goal of the Absolute Idea. But
though not on the line of march, they are near by, and it
takes only a little flank movement to sweep them into it.
But this flank movement arrests the procession " for the
subjective spirit," as Hegel would say. It appears as if
there were a zigzag movement with constant stops, and not
a " never-halting march ".4
I may illustrate what I mean by borrowing and developing
the metaphor Hegel uses for representing the absolute unity
of thought. This unity is a circle; thought's movement
is iti an orbit that returns upon itself. But suppose that
one has not yet discovered the orbit, does not even know
whether there be any orbit or any movement; suppose one
loses one's perspective, and, from any position, views two
points in the circumference of. the circle. These points
'".Enc., Section 169."
* Op. tit., pp. 123, 124.
' I wish to call especial attention to this reservation. For, from an-
other point of view, it is the pedigree of all.
4 1. , 89(41): "In unaufhaltsamem . . . Gange".
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58 E. B. MCGILVABT:
may appear to him side by side, rather than one in advance
of the other. The more advanced point is then viewed as if it
were collateral with the nearer; hence when a movement is
discovered and is supposed to be in a bee-line from the point
of observation through one of these points on to the infinite,
it will seem as though a digression must be made from this
line in order to catch the other point into the mdvement.
In the same way a higher category is viewed as if it were
co-ordinate with a lower one; so viewed, it will not have all
the characteristics it should have, else it would not appear
co-ordinate. In such a case, it is clear that when the lower
category has advanced to the higher, it will not have passed
through the form the higher takes when reduced to a lower
plane. Now, as ordinary thought is abstract and thinks its
categories in their abstractness, and not in their concrete-
ness, it will be necessary, when dialectic comes alongside of
a category in its abstract form, to show how this abstract
category develops itself into the same concrete fulness into
which its seeming co-ordinate was developed. To change
the figure, the stone which, in the structure of speculative
logic, has its significance only as resting on the lower stones
and furnishing a. basis for the higher, is by the common
thinker torn out of its place and used as an independent
unit. It is the business of the speculative builder, when he
reaches this stone in its structural place, to show that even
when lying apart it bears traces upon itself that cannot fail
to indicate that such isolation is not proper to it, but that it
belongs to an architectural system ; and to show that these
traces also indicate where it belongs in that system.
But even this is not all. Common understanding has its
own ways of artificially grouping these abstract categories.
One way, and a very favourite way, especially in dealing with
the categories that dialectic reaches first, is to pair them off,
and to set each member of a pair over against the other, as
of equal rank, but mutually incompatible. Thus from the
abstract point of view, these paired-off categories are contra-
dictory to each other; and what dialectic does, appears to
be a reconciling of these contradictions. When Hegel, there-
fore, speaks of any category " as such," he means that cate-
gory regarded as the " un speculative" thinker regards i t ;
that is, as leading to no dialectical result, and even as indepen-
dent of the process by which speculative logic has reached it.
And when he speaks of its "opposite," he means, in the lower
categories, what the abstract thinker regards as its irrecon-
cilable contradictory; and when he speaks of " reconciling "
these contradictories, he is merely using language that repre-
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THE DIALECTICAL METHOD. 59
Bents the view of abstract thought. Dialectic, however, does
not recognise the claims of the opposites to be incompatible,
and hence need perform no atoning work. To put this in
technical Hegelian language, it is merely external reflexion
that regards the speculative logic as reconciling contra-
dictories. Logic itself, in performing this operation which
an onlooker calls a reconciliation, is not conscious of being
engaged in a ministry of reconciliation, but is only conscious
of advancing from a lower to a higher category.
What I have said above may easily be misunderstood ; for
it may seem to imply that the higher category is not a unity
of opposites. It is such a unity, but not of contradictory
opposites, or of contrary opposites, as these terms are used in
the traditional logic; and it is this fact that I have wished to
make prominent, and 1 may be thought to have carried the
emphasis on to the point of danger. To put it all in one
sentence, logic takes what appear to be contradictories, and
does what appears to be a reconciling of them ; but succeeds
in so doing, merely because they are not such contradictories
as cannot be thought together in one thought.
The best proof of the correctness of this exposition is the
light that it throws upon many a dark passage in Hegel's
Logic. If we bear in mind the double aspect of the negative
categories, we shall be able to solve riddles that otherwise
would remain insoluble, except by the Gordian-knot method
to which Mr. McTaggart has resorted. I shall quote one pas-
sage of the many that find their explanation only in what has
just been said. In' the Greater Logic, under the section,
Determinate Being as Such, there is a sub-section, Determin-
ate Being in General. Here we read : " Determinate Being
arises out of Becoming. Determinate Being is the simple
unity of Being and Naught. Because of this simplicity, it
has the form of an immediate. Its mediation, Becoming, lies
behind it, has been sublated. Determinate Being, therefore,
appears as a primal datum from which we take our start." *
Here it is evident that Hegel is not concerned with deter-
minate Being as it has been mediated—that is, as it appears
to the speculative thinker—but as it appears apart from its
mediation. He seems to be giving an answer, not to the
question how this category hat arisen in the course of the
dialectical process, but to the question how it comes, that, if
it has thus arisen, it appears unmediated. The answer is
that the process lies behind the category, and the unspecu-
lative thinker does not look behind for it, but looks only at
1 1. , 108 and 107 (112 and 113).
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6 0 B. B. MCOILVABY:
what lies immediately before him. It is true that there is some
excuse for such neglect on the part of the thinker; for, in
one sense, this category, as well as every other, is immediate
even from the point of view of the speculative thinker ; for
immediacy is not a characteristic on the same level with
mediation and antagonistic to it. Like all true dialectical
negatives, it is higher than that which it negates, containing
mediateness as one of its moments. In this sWse imme-
diacy is self-mediation; and it is in this sense thavdetermin-
ate Being is for the speculative thinker immediate"; for its
presuppositions, its moments, its media are in it and not be-
hind it. This is one of the things that Hegel means when
he says that in this category mediation is sublated ; for to
sublate means both to cancel and to retain. Mediation is
cancelled, for this category is immediate; and it is retained,
for this category is, from a higher point of view, self-
mediated. But a full insight into this truth does not yet
appear, and it would be anticipating a later result of the dia-
lectic to bring forth this truth at this stage. This revelation
will be made first by the category of Being-for-self. Hence
the real purpose of introducing determinate Being as imme-
diate and of saying that it appears as a new starting-point,
is to account for the apparent immediacy of the category as
it is ordinarily regarded.
We are now ready to return to the discussion upon which
we entered on the second page of this paper, and to examine
the claim .made by Mr. McTaggart, that in the categories of
Being the dialectic advance is made possible only by outer
reflexion. And the first thing to do is to determine the
meaning of the expression " outer reflexion". It is a phrase
constantly used by Hegel in his Logic, and fully explained in
the Second Book;' but it will not be necessary to quote and
to explain this difficult passage, for I do not intend to give
an outline of Hegel's doctrine of reflexion, but merely to
touch upon such features of this doctrine, or rather upon
such corollaries from it, as bear upon our present purpose.
It does not concern us to investigate the true dialectical
relation between the different kinds of reflexion, but merely
to ascertain what Hegel means when he denies that outer
reflexion is the motive power in the earlier categories, and
what Mr. McTaggart presumably means when he asserts
that it is the only means used to secure the dialectical
advance in these categories.
Outer reflexion is a way of regarding two categories as
1 IL, 19 (19), seq.
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THE DIALECTICAL METHOD. 61
having no genetic relation to each other, bat as merely co-
existing in the thinker's mind independently of each other.
This thinker, as a third party, compares the categories and
passes judgment upon them as to resemblance or difference.
This judgment does not affect the true inner nature of the
categories, but merely records the impression they make on
an onlooker. For a corroboration of this description of the
function of outer reflexion, I shall quote two passages from
the First Book of the Greater Logic; for it is this book that
deals with the categories now in question. In one passage
Hegel says: "This sameness of the determinations" (of
Something and Other) " is only a matter of outer reflexion,
of comparison of the two ".1 Here we see an identification
of outer reflexion and comparison. The second passage is
more explicit. " We have still," says he, " to mention par-
ticularly the word unity, which is, if I may say so, very in-
felicitous. It designates, even more than identity does, a
subjective reflexion ; for it is for the most part considered as
a relation that arises from comparison, from external re-
flexion. In as far as this faculty finds the same characteris-
tic in two different objects, a unity is present in such wise
that, withal, there is also presupposed the complete indiffer-
ence to this unity on the part of the objects themselves that
are compared. The act of comparing, therefore, and the
unity do not concern the objects themselves at all, but are
an activity and a determination external to them."2 Ex-
ternal or outer reflexion, then, brings together two cate-
gories considered as mutually independent, and establishes
a relation between them for its own convenience ; but this
relation is not regarded as in any way arising from their
true inner nature, or as in any way affecting that nature.
Inner reflexion is opposed to this outer reflexion.3 What
this inner reflexion is can be seen by studying the passage in
the Introduction to the Greater Logic, where Hegel says
that " the divisions and headings of the books, sections and
chapters . . . do not belong to the contents and body of the
science, but are arrangements of outer reflexion. . . . They
are meant to have no other significance than that of a table
of contents. But, besides, the necessity of the connexion "
(of the categories thus brought together externally) " and
the immanent origin of the distinctions are found in the
treatment of the subject-matter itself; for they are in-
volved in the progressive self-determination of the conception.
That by which the conception accomplishes its sel.-advance-
1
 I., 117 (123). « I., 84 and 85 (90). * I., 94 (100).
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62 E. B. MCGILVABT:
ment is the aforesaid negative, that it has in it. This con-
stitutes the truly dialectical feature. . . . Ordinarily the
dialectic is regarded as an external and negative activity,
that does not belong to the subject-matter itself. This
activity is supposed to have its source in mere vain caprice,
acting as a subjective impulse to take what is firm and true
and make it totter and fall to pieces."' Here the contrast
between outer and inner reflexion is clearly stated, although
inner reflexion is not mentioned by name. While in outer
reflexion the relation between two categories is established,
not by the categories themselves, but by an outsider, in
inner reflexion one category is seen to rise inevitably out of
the other by immanent necessity, by reason of the negative
that resides in the other. " Outside reflexion " is therefore
subjective, and is contingent on the attitude of an outsider.
Inner reflexion is objective, and is necessary from the very
inner constitution of the object.
With the caveat already entered, that I am here treating
of outer and of inner reflexion only in their bearing upon my
present purpose, and not in their dialectical relations to
each other, I am now ready to examine Mr. McTaggart's
assertion that, in the categories of Being, " it is only outside
reflexion which . . . shows us that the dialectical process is
inevitable ". But as he maintains that the process through-
out Being is not uniform, so he would perhaps say that the
kind of reflexion involved in the advance changes with the
advance, and that if we want a typical instance of the
enginery used in Being, we must take up the very first triad.
So be it. If we can prove that the advance here is not due
to outer reflexion, a fortiori we may conclude that nowhere
is it due to outer reflexion.
Hegel himself realises the difficulty of getting a start.
This difficulty lies in the fact that we must begin with an
immediate category, with one that has not arisen from any
other; for if it has so arisen it is no longer the first category,
but its source is a category prior to it. But any immediate
category must be simple; it may have no moments or con-
stitutive factors; else it would not be immediate, but would
be mediated by these moments.2 But if it has no moments
it would seem as if it must be a dead self-identity; and
any progress from the category could not therefore be ac-
1
 I., 39-41 (42 and 43).
s
 I have discussed this point quite at length in an article on " The Pre-
supposition Question in Hegel's Lo#c " in the Philosophical Review,
September, 1897, pp. 512 se.q.
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THE DIALECTICAL METHOD. 63
complished by any indwelling motive power, but must be
due to power from some external source. The advance is
forced upon it from outside and is in no sense its own act.
This, then, is the apparent dilemma that Hegel had to
face : Either there are moments immanent in the first cate-
gory or there are none. If there are, then the first category
is not the first category. If there are none, then the move-
ment must be due to external reflexion, and is not a
necessary logical movement at all. Hegel, however, evi-
dently believed that this dilemma was more apparent than
real; for on the very page of his Greater Logic where he
calls attention to the fact that the transition in the first triad
appears different from the subsequent transitions1 he states
that inner reflexion is at work here as well as outer re-
flexion ; and we shall soon see that inner reflexion is the true
organon of the dialectical movement, and that outer reflexion
is appealed to for the reason that we are dealing with cate-
gories appearing in a form not amenable to dialectic, because
not capable of being thought. As they are not thought-
determinations at all when appearing in this form, but are
mere make-believes, their spurious character must be shown
by the faculty of make-believe, that is, by external reflexion.
Even the very way in which the two kinds of reflexion are
spoken of here, shows which is the active power. Hegel
is saying to his unspeculative opponent, who wants to test
everything by outer reflexion: "Your own outer reflexion,
as well as the inner reflexion proper to logic, sets down the
indefiniteness of pure Being as equal to Naught, and declares
it to be a mere creation of thought, a nothing ".2 Thus we
see that, in the very first triad, he shows, in the most un-
mistakable way, his belief that inner reflexion is the
vehicle of progress.
Let us now see whether we can discover how he justifies
to himself such an escape from the apparent dilemma that
confronts him. His statement of the difference which ap-
pears between the transition from the first to the second
category, and all the later transitions, is this : " In the pure
reflexion of the beginning, such as is made in this Logic
with Being as such, the transition is still hidden. Because
Being is only posited as immediate, Naught breaks forth
into view in it only immediately. But all the follow-
I., 94 (100).
2
 Ibid., " Diese Unbestimmtheit oder abstracte Negation, welche so
das Seyn an ihm selbst hat, ist es, was die aussere wie die innere Re-
flexion ausspricht, indem sie es dem Nichts gleicb setzt".
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64 B. B. MCGHiVABY:
ing categories, e.g., determinate Being, are more concrete "
{i.e., complex, made up of factors). " There has already
been explicitly posited in them the element that contains
and produces the contradictions of those abstractions, and
therefore contains and produces their transition. In Being
as simple and immediate, the recollection that it is the
result of complete abstraction and thus is already abstract
negativity or Naught, has been laid aside before entering
upon our science. But in the course of the science, ex-
pressly from Essence onward, that one-sided\immediacy will
be shown to be mediated ; for there Being appears as
Existence,1 and the mediating factor of this Being, the
Ground, is explicitly posited." * \
Again in another place he says: "We may still make
another remark about the character of the' transition of
Being and Naught into each other, namely, that this tran-
sition is to be conceived without the help of any further
categories of reflexion. It is immediate and entirely ab-
stract, because of the abstraction of the transitive moments,
that is, because there has not been explicitly posited in
either of these moments the determinateness of the other,
by means of which the transition could be effected. Naught
is not yet posited in Being, although Being is essentially
Naught, and vice versa. Hence it is not permissible to
apply here principles of mediation which are further deter-
mined, and to conceive of Being and Naught as in some
essential relation (Verhaltniss)—the transition is not as yet
an essential relation. It is thus not proper to say: ' Naught
is the ground of Being, or Being is the ground of Naught';
or to say, ' Naught is the cause of Being, and so forth'; or
again to say: ' There can be transition into Naught only
under the condition that something is, or into Being only
under the condition of Non-Being'. The kind of relation
(Beziehung) cannot be further determined without further
determining at the same time the related sides. The nexus
of Ground and Consequence, for instance, no longer has for
its connected sides mere Being and Naught, but it has " (as
one side) " expressly Being that is Ground, and " (as the
other side) "something which is indeed only posited, not
independent, but something which is not abstract Naught,"3
because abstract Naught is independent.
1
 Here let the reader bear in mind the etymology of this word, ex-
sutentia, a standing forth out of something as its ground. It is Being in
an essential relation.
a
 I., 94 and 95 (100). 3 L, 99 and 100 (105 and 106).
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THE DIALECTICAL METHOD. 65
And once again, at the end of the completed work, where
he reviews the whole dialectical procedure in the light of the
final result, he says: " The beginning has, accordingly, for
this method no other characterisation than that it is the
simple and universal. . . . The universal, however, in the
absolute method, is not regarded as a mere abstract, but as
the objective universal, that is, as that which of itself
(an sich) is the concrete totality, but a totality not yet
explicitly posited, not yet for itself" (i.e., not yet explicitly
recognised). "Even the abstract universal as such is in
its concept, that is, considered in its truth, not merely the
simple; but as abstract it is already explicitly posited as
infected with negation. There is, therefore, whether in
reality or in thought, nothing so simple and so abstract as
one usually supposes. Such a simple is a mere make-
believe, which has its ground only in the unconsciousness
of what is in fact present. The initial category has been
previously characterised as the immediate; this immediacy
of the universal is the very same thing that is here expressed
as that which is of itself, without being for itself. . . .
The concrete totality which makes the beginning has, as
such, in itself (in ihr selbst) the beginning of the advance
and of the development. It is, as concrete, possessed of dis-
tinctions within itself (in sich unterschieden). Because of
its first immediacy, however, the first distinct elements are
at first different. However, the immediate, as self-referred
universality, as subject, is also the unity of these different
elements. This reflexion is the first stage of the advance,
the emergence of difference, judgment^ determination. The
essential thing is that the absolute method finds and recog-
nises the determination of the universal in the universal
itself. The finite knowledge of the understanding proceeds,
in the act of determination, in the following way: what it
laid aside in the creation of the universal by abstraction, it
takes up again from the concrete in just as external a
manner. On the contrary, the absolute method does not
conduct itself as external reflexion, but gets the determinate
out of the object itself, seeing that the method is the very
immanent principle and soul of the object."2
I have made these many long quotations because the
1
 Hegel's use of " Urtheil" is peculiar, and, for the beginner, is puz-
zling. He takes it in the sense of a self-originated diremption of a
concept; and it should, perhaps,-be so translated here.
2
 III., 323-326 (333-335), quoted, as the asterisks show, with large
omissions.
5
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66 E. B. MCGILVABY:
point they are meant to support is so important, and that
point is this. Although the first category appears as simple
and abstract, it is not so in reality, and the negation which
seems to stand beside it as a mere indifferent neighbour is,
in fact, " bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh," an Eve
created out of the rib of Adam. But this immanent origin
does not make itself manifest in the beginning; or, to use
Hegel's own language just quoted, " in the pure reflexion of
the beginning the transition is still hidden ". At that stage,
then, all that one can say is, that " Naught breaks forth into
view in Being only immediately ". There seems, as yet, to
be no mediation for it on the part either of Being or of some
third and external agent. We are not yet in a position to say
that the emergence of the category Naught is due either to
outer or to inner reflexion.1 Just as the first category is taken
in its immediacy, so the second is, at this point, to be con-
sidered as immediate. But just as further on we shall see
that our first category is not immediate to the exclusion of
mediation, but is mediated and seZ/-mediated, so we shall see
that the movement from the first category, which surprises
us now because we cannot see any mediation for it, is
mediated by the very moments which we shall find to me-
diate Being. As soon as Being shows itself up as not simple
but complex, the apparently immediate emergence of the
thought of Naught upon the thought of Being shows itself
to be brought about by the originally hidden, but actually
present,' complex factors of Being. The transition is, then,
really made by virtue of the negative that lurks unseen in
pure Being; but because the negative is at present in hid-
ing, the act of transition is also hidden.
There are thus three different kinds of reflexion that may
deal with the relation existing between the categories of the
first triad—-pure reflexion, external reflexion and internal re-
flexion. Let us now proceed to see in detail how each kind
of reflexion will exhibit the relation and how Hegel ex-
presses the result obtained by each.
1. Pure reflexion puts the relation thus : " Because Being
is only posited as immediate, Naught breaks forth into view
in it only immediately. The transition is as yet hidden."
This is Hegel's own way of representing the point of view of
1
 It is this inability to say anything as yet about the mediation of
Naught, that makes Hegel call the reflexion at this stage "pure re-
flexion" (In der reinen Reflexion des An/angs, i., 94 (100)). "Pure"
here means two things. It means " not externally mediated," and also
" apparently not mediated at all". I t has the same meanings when used
with Being and Naught, as will appear presently.
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THE DIALECTICAL METHOD. 67
pure reflexion.1 To express the same idea more fully, we
should say that the thought (category) of Being can never be
thought alone; but in thinking it we discover that we
are always at the same time thinking the thought (category)
of Naught. Neither Being alone, nor Naught alone, ever ex-
hausts the content of the thought that thinks either; but
both must be thought together in one synthetic thought.
The conception of Naught is thus to be perceived in the
conception of Being.2 In the concept of Being, in the
thought that clutches it, there is also present, clutched in the
very same grip, another element, namely Naught. This is
what Hegel means in the passage quoted above,3 when he
says: "Even the abstract universal as such is, in its con-
cept, that is, considered in its truth, not merely the simple ;
but, as abstract, it is already posited as infected with nega-
tion ".
2. External reflexion has a different way of setting forth the
relation between Being and Naught, and, as we should ex-
pect, it is a very shallow and superficial way. Pure reflexion
is the immediate act of the infant logic; external reflexion
is the self-confident, but trivial, worthless act of the youthful
logic, which knows only the outside appearance of things,
but thinks it " knows it all". Being an act of comparison,
external reflexion must have some objects given to it, and is
merely concerned with the resemblance or the difference of
these objects as they appear to the subject who reflects only
upon the surface of them. In the present instance, before
external reflexion can act, it must have both Being and
Naught come before it, and then it must compare them.
These conditions are met in Hegel's treatment of these cate-
gories in the text of his Greater Logic, where he says:
" Being, pure Being—without any further determination. In
its undetermined immediacy, it is only like itself nor is it un-
like anything else ; it has no difference within itself, nor any as
against what is without. If any determination or contents
were distinguished within it, or were made the means of
setting it down as distinct from something else, it would not
be maintained in its purity. It is pure indeterminateness
and vacuity. There is nothing to be perceived in it, if we
can here speak of perceiving ; or rather it is only this pure,
empty perceiving itself. Just as little is anything to be
thought in i t : or rather it is likewise only this empty
1 1 . , 94 (100).
* I., 73 (78): " Es ist nichts in ihm anzuschauen ". But see below.
3
 P. 65 above.
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thought. Being, the undetermined immediate, is in fact
Naught, and nothing more or less than Naught."x
Here we see that after Hegel has defined Being, he tells
us that in this category- we see nothing. This may be taken
to mean one of two things. One meaning may be that
which we have already indicated in discussing the point of
view of pure reflexion:2 " I n the thought that thinks the
category of pure Being, we perceive besides the category of
Naught". If this were the correct paraphrase we should
expect "Nichts" and not "nichts," for elsewhere Hegel always
capitalises his categories; here both in the edition of 1812
and in the two issues of the second edition, the word is not
capitalised. We may conclude that this is not the meaning
of the passage, and we are then forced to the alternative
that Hegel's thought is this: " In such an undetermined per-
ception or thought as we have in pure Being, there is not
anything to be seen or thought. Indeed we have a mere
objectless perception or thought; and just such a lack of
object for perception or thought is what we mean by Naught.
Hence the category of undetermined Being is, in fact, exactly
the category of undetermined Naught, no more, no less."
If this is the line of thought, as it seems to be, it is clear
that Hegel could never have said that the category of pure
Being, so defined, was the category of pure Naught, unless
the latter category with its meaning were already indepen-
dently • in his mind, waiting to be compared with the
former. For Hegel has just said that of itself pure Being
has no resemblances. The recognition, therefore, of any
likeness to something else, or of any identity with some-
thing else, cannot have been forced upon him by the
category itself that is now the object of thought; but it
must be the result of an external reflexion on bis part, seeing
that external reflexion differs from the internal reflexion of
the absolute method just in this, that it does not obtain its
result by a process that the object of thought performs.
But if the identification of Being and Naught has been
accomplished by external reflexion, then the category of
Naught does not arise dialectically out of the category of Being,
but is merely pronounced identical with that category by an
external arbiter who decides nothing on its intrinsic merits.
That the course of thought in this passage is that of ex-
ternal reflexion is further shown in the next paragraph, where
Hegel proceeds to justify the identification of Being and
Naught by rehearsing fully the definition of Naught, and by
1
 I., 72 and 73 (77 and 78). 2 P. 67 above.
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showing that it is exactly the same as that of pore Being.
"Naught, pure Naught; it is simple likeness to self, com-
plete vacuity, absence of determinateness and contents,
lack of distinctions within itself. In so far as perception or
thought may be here mentioned, it is generally considered
a distinction whether something or nothing be perceived or
thought To perceive or to think nothing, therefore, has a
meaning; the two" (i.e., something and nothing) "are dis-
tinct ; hence Naught is (exists) in our perception or thought;
or rather it is empty perception and thought itself, and is
the same empty perception or thought as pure Being.
Naught is therefore the same determination, or rather lack
of determination, and hence altogether the same thing, that
pure Being is."* Here it is evident that Hegel is merely
comparing, point by point, the two categories, and as a
result pronounces a judgment of identity between them.
In short, he is simply engaging in external reflexion. But
besides identifying the two categories, he also remarks upon
a distinction which is commonly held to exist between the
no categories. It must, however, be noticed that he here
offers proof of the validity of this distinction. He merely
appeals to current opinion; such an appeal surely is not a
dialectical process.
It seems to me that one cannot escape the conviction that
in the two paragraphs we have here examined, the procedure
is one of external reflexion, and not a dialectical procedure
by internal reflexion. To repeat what has been said, com-
parison of two categories, which of themselves do not prompt
to any such comparison, leads the author to say that they
are identical; current opinion as to their distinctness leads
him to animadvert upon this distinction. It should be ob-
served, however, that from such an identity as has been
established, he has no right to say that Being and Naught
are unseparated and inseparable, and that each vanishes in the
other, and that the truth is neither the one nor the other, but
the effected transition of the one into the other, all of which
he does say in the following paragraph—he has no right to
say this, unless he merely means that the psychological
association in the thinker's mind between Naught and the
definition of Being, and between Being and the definition of
Naught, is so strong that, when he thinks of the definition
of Being, the thought of Naught arises inevitably by spon-
taneous associative processes, and vice versd.
The conclusion of this examination, therefore, is that in
5 * > I., 73 (78).
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7 0 E. B. MCQILVABT: THE DIALECTICAL METHOD.
Hegel's Greater Logic the whole of the text that treats of the
categories, Being and Naught, so far as the identification and
the distinction of the two categories go, is concerned with
exhibiting the work of external reflexion. Now the question
arises, whether these paragraphs contain the only representa-
tion given by Hegel of the relation between these categories.
If so, his case is hopeless. He is unmistakably convicted of
using in the dialectic an instrument that he has in the most
explicit terms declared to be unavailable for the purpose;
and the unity that is brought about between Being and
Naught is as blank a self-identity as was either pure Being
or pure Naught. There is no movement. His thought is as
changeless as the Brahman's, who " year in and year out
gazes at the tip of his own nose and mutters ' Om, Om,
Om' to himself or else keeps silent ".a But did Hegel mean
to palm off this paralysis of thought, this movelessness of
external reflexion, as a genuine dialectical movement of vital
inner reflexion ? Are we forced to the alternative of saying,
either that he himself was deceived in the matter, or else
that he tried to deceive others ? Surely not, when in the
very first paragraph of his first remark2 on this passage he
tells us that in pure Naught he is conceiving only the abstract
negation, and of course we may conclude from the distinction
he is constantly making between abstract negation and dia-
lectical negation that he is not dealing with the latter. In-
deed, he tells us expressly that his purpose is not " to deal
with the form of the opposition" (between Being and Naught)
" that is,vat the same time, with the form of the relation be-
tween them, but with abstract, immediate negation, with
Naught purely independent, with unrelated denial—which,
if one would, one could express by bare not". If it had been
his purpose to exhibit the second category in its dialectical
form and in its dialectical relation, it would have been proper
to substitute Non-Being for Naught, and in such a category
all the dialectical characteristics of the negative would have
manifested themselves. " For in Non-Being the relation to
Being is contained; it is both Being and the negation of
Being expressed in one word; Naught, as it is in Becoming."
He thus disavows, in as clear and unmistakable terms as lan-
guage can provide, any attempt to exhibit a dialectical move-
ment in what he has said about the identity and about the
distinctness of Being and Naught, when treating those cate-
gories in their purity.
1 1 . , 92 (97). ' I., 74 (79).
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